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This short article develops two themes which run throughout Rob Canton’s recent monograph Why Punish? (Canton, 2017) – the concept of ‘punishability’ and that punishment, however justified, constitutes an interference with an individual’s interests.

‘Punishability’ acknowledges that the criminal justice process determines who is ‘worthy’ or ‘deserving’ of punishment. As my colleague, Tim Hillier, and I have put it:

‘Decisions have to be made which can have far-reaching consequences, not only to the person whose conduct is or is not adjudged to be culpable. Other stakeholders are affected, perhaps most notably those directly harmed by the incident: the attribution of blame may change the sense in which they are seen to be victims. More broadly, society is affected by our readiness to apportion blame and by the consequences which follow such a finding.’ (Dingwall and Hillier, 2016, pp.168-169)

Claims that someone is ‘blameworthy’ and ‘deserving’ of punishment demand careful scrutiny given that their individual interests are at stake. Quantifying ‘blame’ is not easy. Take the example of a woman in her early thirties who has been convicted of theft from a shop. She has a history of (mostly minor) property offending and asks that seven additional offences are taken into account by the court. Her offence shows considerable planning. Physical and sexual abuse and material and emotional neglect led to her being taken into local authority care when she was 12. Attempts to place her with foster families proved unsuccessful and she spent most of her teenage years in care homes. Her educational potential has been unfulfilled and she has never secured regular employment. She has had a number of relationships with men who have exploited and abused her. Her current partner is bullying and her defence solicitor believes that he has more to do with the offending than she is prepared to disclose.

When an account like this is presented, it is sometimes seen as an attempt to elicit sympathy for the offender and, by implication, to minimise his or her personal responsibility. This is the purpose of a defence lawyer’s plea in mitigation. Presenting more detail has the effect of making the offender more complex and more human. The key point is that, if detail is now extracted, the remaining facts distort and mislead. The likelihood of injustice is increased and the effectiveness of any intervention is threatened.

To return to the example, there is evident harm: shops lost goods. Prima facie she would appear ‘punishable’. Is there though a reliable and objective test for determining whether someone is ‘punishable’ and, if she is, how culpable she is? The Sentencing Council in England and Wales have sought to provide guidance on these questions (Sentencing Council, 2015). They provide a list of factors which, in effect, prescribe what facts are relevant in theft cases and, if something is relevant, the effect that it should have on sentence. But this scenario, which is in no way atypical, does not lend itself to easy classification. For example, the guidelines suggest she is ‘highly culpable’ due to the significant planning yet she has ‘low culpability’ as there is a perception that ‘coercion, intimidation or exploitation’ was present. Even if it is accepted that she is ‘punishable’, the invidious task of determining how culpable she is remains. This, primarily, is a retributive concern. Canton acknowledges that it is a moral imperative to determine who should be held to account – and, of course, this does not necessarily correspond to who is held accountable – for their actions:

‘Retribution, in all of its many formulations, sets limits to the amount of punishment: it will always be relevant to protest that a punishment is excessive or too lenient. Retribution also binds the imposition and the amount of punishment tightly to an offender’s actions, to conduct for which they can fairly be held responsible.’ (Canton, 2017, p.81)

These concerns are vital given the impact punishment has on an offender’s interests. It is to this that the article now turns. Early in Why Punish?, Canton asks whether the ‘hardship or deprivation’ explicit in most definitions of punishment depends ‘on the intention of the punisher, or the experience of the person punished’ (p.4). This question transcends penal justification. If retribution is paramount, an ‘identical’ proportionate punishment may lead to exceptionally diverse penal experience:

‘[Two] years’ imprisonment in a single setting will have very different meanings to different offenders who committed the same crime. Two years’ imprisonment in a maximum security prison may be a rite of passage for a Los Angeles gang member. For an attractive, effeminate twenty-year-old, it may mean the terror of repeated sexual victimisation. For a forty-year-old head of household, it may mean the loss of a job and a home and a family. For the unhealthy seventy-year old, it may be a death sentence.’ (Tonry, 1996, p.19)

The quest to achieve a consistent proportionate penal response is jeopardised if the offender’s individuality is not adequately reflected. Sentencing guidelines of the type mentioned above simply cannot do this. However, marginalising the interests of the offender is problematic for those who seek to justify punishment on consequentialist grounds. Canton explains the dilemma: 

‘Crucial too are the objectives that the offender may decide on for herself: perhaps originally welcoming a probation order simply as a way of avoiding prison, she may come to appreciate the support it offers and the opportunities it provides. Not nearly enough is known about how offenders themselves understand and experience their punishments; the meanings they find and any purposes that they set may variously support or perhaps subvert the purposes set by others.’ (2017, p.40)

Here there is an alignment between what is seen to be in the offender’s best interests and what she eventually sees as being in her best interests. But this is often not the case. Returning to the scenario given above, the shoplifter demonstrated no remorse for her actions and believed that there was no alternative to stealing in order to obtain money. Any attempt to address her offending raises the issue of whether intervention would be in her best interests? There are fundamental questions of agency here which relate to the definition of punishment (is it punishment if an offender does not perceive the outcome as a hardship?), to potential justifications of punishment (different perceptions of punishment may impact upon their effectiveness), to perceptions of legitimacy (if the offender believes her interests are being ignored or marginalised) and to how criminal justice professionals perceive their role.
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^1	  This article is based on a paper delivered at a symposium on punishment organised by the Midland Branch of the British Criminology Society held at De Montfort University, Leicester in December 2017. I wish to thank the other speakers, Rob Canton and Anne Worrall, for their comments on the themes addressed here and to Vic Knight who organised the symposium. 
